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Abstract
This article investigates the use of collective action in the public sector by analysing the
Danish teacher lock-out in 2013. The social partners in the public sector in Denmark
(and the other Nordic countries) engage in negotiations and reach agreements regard-
ing wages and working conditions in accordance with an institutional set-up developed
in the private sector. This also applies to the use of the so-called weapons of conflict –
strikes/blockades and lock-outs/boycotts – in connection with labour disputes if the
parties are unable to reach agreement through negotiations or mediation. But there is a
big difference in the premises and conditions upon which collective industrial conflict as
an institutionalised form of collective action proceeds when comparing the public and
private sectors in Denmark. The article shows how the use of collective industrial
conflicts in the public sector has a number of built-in systemic institutional flaws, as
the public employers are the budgetary authority and legislators at the same time.
This is not a new finding; however, these multiple roles become problematic when
public employers use the lock-out weapon offensively in combination with state inter-
vention to end the dispute, which was the case during the teacher lock-out in 2013 in
Denmark. The article concludes with the presentation of a number of proposed insti-
tutional adjustments for bringing the public bargaining model into balance.
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Introduction
The analysis of collective action and changing labour strategies in comparative
political economy often has a point of departure in the private sector, where
changing global settings are often described as drivers of change for labour, espe-
cially in competitive-sensitive industries (Harvey and Turnbull, 2015; Kuruvilla
and Noronha, 2016; Lichtenstein, 2010). Here, new global value chains, price
competition and migration of workers all have a direct impact on labour in various
ways, such as increasing precarisation, off-shoring of production and so on (Stone
and Arthurs, 2013). In the public sector, however, the cause and effect of the new
global economy for labour are not so easily readable but are nevertheless still
present and crucial. Changing wages and working conditions in the public sector
must pass through a political filter with a variety of outcomes based on the insti-
tutional set-up of the national industrial relations systems. Past institutions, ideas
and interests are all mediating factors impacting the consequences for labour.
In post-crisis Europe since 2008, ‘austerity’ measures, competiveness reforms and
modernisation efforts have swept through public sector labour markets with vary-
ing intensity: from significant cut-backs in wages, pensions and longer working
hours to employment and wage freezes (Bach and Bordogna, 2013). This has
created ‘growing interest cleavage’ between the social partners (Brandl and
Traxler, 2011: 15).
Traditionally, the Nordic countries are renowned for their high degree of collect-
ive bargaining and social capital among the labour partners (Dølvik, 2013). This is
the case for the private sector and still more so the public sector. Wages and
working conditions in the public sector are generally regulated via collective agree-
ments between the social partners. In fact, there is close to 100% collective agree-
ment coverage in the Danish public sector, whereas the figure is around 70% for
the private sector (Ibsen et al., 2012). But collective agreements as the main method
of regulating wages and working conditions are at the same time rather new to the
public sector compared to the private sector, which has had rules for how the social
partners voluntarily engage in collective bargaining since the renowned September
Compromise of 1899 – the world’s first general agreement – including rules for how
and when the social partners can initiate labour disputes (Ibsen and Jørgensen,
1979). It was first in 1973 that a system of industrial relations with a mediation
institute and labour court was established for the public sector. In this sense, the
model of regulating wages and working conditions in Denmark has been developed
in the private sector and subsequently adopted in the public sector, with respect to
both collective bargaining and conflict resolution. Similar historical developments
can be traced to the other Nordic countries (Stokke, 1998).
As argued in this article, however, there are major differences in the public
and private sectors with respect to the use of collective industrial conflict as an
institutionalised form of collective action. Industrial conflict is regulated through
the general agreement and follows a principal of parallelism: employees can strike
and employers can use the lock-out weapon when collective agreements are
2 Journal of Industrial Relations 0(0)
re-negotiated. However, in contrast to the private sector, public employers are not
merely employers but also the budgetary authority and legislators. This means that
they have a number of unique power resources that (potentially) create an asym-
metrical balance of power between the social partners.
After a brief presentation of the data sources and methods used in the article, the
theory and rationale behind the collective industrial conflict in the private sector
are presented. We later examine how the collective industrial conflict has become
part of the public bargaining model, including the principle differences between
the public and private sectors in terms of the use of strikes and lock-outs to solve
labour disputes. A critical analysis of the use of industrial conflict in the public
sector is then presented, as exemplified by the teacher lock-out in the Danish school
system in 2012–2013. The article concludes with a presentation of possible adjust-
ments to the present collective industrial conflict system in the public sector.
Data and method
The empirical data used in this article draws on events prior to, during and after the
collective bargaining round in the public sector in 2013 (CBR13). We have chosen
the course of events surrounding the 2013 collective bargaining, as a number of
interesting conditions and relationships were involved that give reason to raise
questions about the conflict resolution model used in the public sector. First of
all, the teacher lock-out in 2013 was the first time in Danish history that public
employers used the lock-out weapon offensively and not just as a response to a
strike or strike warning posed by one or more trade union(s). Second, the teacher
lock-out was ended by a state intervention, which is common in Denmark; how-
ever, in this case, the law that supersedes the prior collective agreement was very
much unbalanced in favouring the employers’ demands. Both circumstances illus-
trate a new public employer behaviour and strategy and new terms of collective
action. Hence, our research design is based on the causal reasoning behind
the extreme case design formulated by Flyvbjerg (2006). The idea is to obtain
information on unusual cases, which can be especially problematic or especially
good in a more closely defined sense.
The method used is a qualitative desk study of relevant documents published in
connection with CBR13. There is first and foremost the use of primary sources in
the form of official documents that are available from stakeholders involved,
including documents used in connection with the exchange of demands. The article
also uses documents published by public authorities and is supplemented by four
interviews with central negotiators carried out in December 2013. The interviews
were carried out using a semi-structured questionnaire and aimed at acquiring
knowledge about the bargaining process, which cannot be mapped out in the
document study. In this connection, an important point to be made is that it has
not been possible to obtain reports about the exchanges between the social partners
in the mediation institute, as the social partners are bound to secrecy with respect
to these matters.
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The rational basis for labour disputes as institutionalised
collective action
One of the oldest but still most commonly used models for the conduct of the parties
involved in a strike was developed by English economist John Hicks in 1932 (Hicks,
1932). The strong appeal of the Hicks model is presumably to be found in its descrip-
tion of the process through which the parties successively make concessions to one
another in order to reach an agreement. In Figure 1, where wage levels are placed in
relation to the duration of a strike, there are curves describing the behaviour of the
trade unions and employers in the course of a dispute. The trade union’s ‘resistance
curve’ displays the period in which union members are willing to maintain their wage
demands instead of giving in and reducing their demands. The curve has a negative
slope, as the costs of a strike increase as it wears on. If the duration of a strike is to be
reduced, the unions must compromise on their demands. The employers’ ‘concession
curve or schedule’ displays a collection of points on which the expected costs of
continuing a strike and the expected costs of giving in to the trade unions’ demands
balance out. The employers’ concession curve has a positive slope, as they must offer
greater wage increases in order to reduce the duration of a strike.
Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between wage levels (W) and the duration of a
strike (T). The point where the two curves meet is the point of balance between the
trade unions’ wage demands and the willingness of the employers to raise wages (W1,
T1). There is therefore a basis for concluding a new collective agreement and then the
strike can end. The smaller the numerical slope of the two curves, the longer a strike
will last. As strikes have negative economic consequences for third parties in addition
to the two parties directly involved, one might – particularly in the Danish context –
UR Union Resistance Curve
EC Employers Concession Schedule  
W  
T  
W1
T1
Figure 1. The Hicks model.
4 Journal of Industrial Relations 0(0)
imagine that after having consulted with the parties to hear about their willingness to
grant concessions to their respective counterparts, the government might choose to
intervene and end the dispute with regulatory intervention (Due et al., 1993).
The Hicks model is a strike model but can easily be supplemented with the
employers’ use of the lock-out weapon in response to how the trade unions use
the strike weapon. Many of the labour disputes in the Danish private labour
market have been started by employers initiating a lock-out, to which the trade
unions respond by striking (Ibsen and Jørgensen, 1979). In the Hicks model, the
combination of a strike and lock-out merely means that the numerical slope of
the two curves grows and the length of the dispute, ceteris paribus, will be less, as
both parties will feel the economic impact of the dispute harder as it continues.
The crucial point in the Hicks model – and thus in the respective rationales of
strikes and lock-outs – is that both parties feel the economic impact such that they
become willing to make concessions to their counterpart, thereby reaching an
agreement that stops or prevents the dispute. The finances of the trade union
members grow worse with each passing day, as strike pay is less than their daily
wages and they must subsequently pay higher union dues to restore their war chest.
Moreover, it is uncertain how many of the striking workers will be rehired after the
dispute. Correspondingly, the employers lose revenue and profits as the strike con-
tinues, and there are more permanent losses in terms of lost customers in domestic
and export markets. In this sense the conflicts contribute to peace, as the threat or
initiation of a dispute will bring the parties to the negotiating table and get them to
make concessions with one another in order to avoid more significant economic
losses. In this sense, collective industrial conflict serves to make the parties account-
able and reduces the number of disputes (Scheuer, 2006; Stamhus et al., 2010).
The concession curves in the Hicks model thus require power relations that are
more or less symmetrical, such that one part does not possess the market power
that renders them able to crush their counterpart.
Many reservations have been registered by critics of the Hicks model. The
assumption of symmetrical power relations in the private sector has been chal-
lenged by radical theorists who consider the capitalist as the strongest part in the
ongoing struggle between labour and capital (Hyman, 1972; Ashenfelter and
Johnson, 1969; Galenson 1952). Moreover, it is easy to see that, in the public
sector, a strike is in no way an economic threat to the employers but more of a
moral appeal to politicians (Mailand, 2014; Scheuer et al., 2016). Public sector
trade unions must appeal to the general public (and voters) in the hope that the
public opinion will swing in favour of their demands. The media becomes a central
battleground for the two parties during the conflict.
Comparison of labour disputes as institutionalised collective
action in the private and public sectors
As strikes and lock-outs also occur in the public sector, most recently in Denmark
in connection with the collective bargaining agreements in 2008 and 2013, it is
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relevant to compare the course of these disputes and the rationale behind the
utilisation of the collective industrial conflict in the two sectors from a theoretical
perspective. As demonstrated in the previous section, the collective industrial con-
flict in the form of strikes/lock-outs makes good sense as a means to exhaust the
parties simultaneously, thereby motivating them to reach a new collective agree-
ment. But is this logic found in the public sector and is the strike and/or lock-out a
suitable means to renew collective agreements in the public sector?
The problem in the public sector is that strikes and lock-outs are not fought out
in a marketplace or in a negotiation situation in which the employers create a profit
and earn supernormal profits. Add to this other significant differences in the ‘indus-
trial relations system’ surrounding the two sectors. This is outlined in Table 1.
Table 1 lists the significant differences between the public and private sectors in
key parts of the industrial relations systems. The question here is whether these
differences give cause for differences in the power position of the trade unions and
employers in the two sectors. To begin with, the trade unions in the private sector
are disciplined by market competition, and they only stand to gain in those cases
where there is a profit margin forming a buffer or a market structure allowing
companies to regulate prices. As indicated in the table, the budgetary conditions
are put together differently in the public sector. It is therefore worth discussing
what implications this has for the trade unions in the public sector with respect to
improving wages and working conditions for their members, possibly by using the
strike weapon as an institutionalised form of collective action.
One view in relation to the discussions about differences in the budgetary con-
ditions is that in contrast to most of the goods and services produced in the private
sector, services produced in the public sector are marked by an inelastic demand
due to their character as essential goods. Healthcare, defence and the police are
examples. If the demand for services is inelastic, then the demand for labour is as
well. This indicates how the trade unions in the public sector basically have rela-
tively greater power and ability to raise wages, as the trade unions do not risk their
members losing their jobs. The opposite is the case in the private sector. The lack
of discipline from the market mechanism on the background of the public unions
is a favourable position for negotiations and collective action such as strikes.
This argument has been put forward as one of the main reasons why many coun-
tries have seen more stable collective bargaining coverage in the public sector
compared to the private sector (Bordogna, 2015).
In contrast to the aforementioned opinion, however, one might claim that the
local suppliers (municipalities and regions in Denmark) are subject to strong
budgetary restrictions posed at the state level. Should the municipalities in
Denmark be tempted to meet the wage demands of their employees, the budgetary
conditions mean that increased wages must be accompanied by adjustments to the
amount of services produced and thus to the number of employees. Obviously, this
disciplines the public sector trade unions.
Another argument for a limited power position for the public unions relates to
how the municipalities and regions enjoy something close to monopoly status as
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the suppliers of health and welfare services. Yet the municipalities and regions can
basically be regarded as monopolies with respect to the supply of public services,
which gives the unions some measure of wiggle room to increase wages at the
negotiation table locally, thereby increasing tax revenues. This option is limited,
Table 1. Comparison of the ‘industrial relations’ system in the public and private sectors in
Denmark.
Public sector Private sector
Actors
Management Elected politicians Owner or owner-employed
managers
Unions Dominated by organisations for
white-collar groups
Organisations for both white-
and blue-collar workers
Technology and market structure
Products Services that are difficult to
measure, prices that are not
set by the market
Market prices for goods and
services
Competition Monopolies in local communities Predominantly competition-
dominated markets
Budgetary conditions Public budgetary restrictions.
Collective agreement system.
Moratorium on new taxes.
Tax payments regardless of
strikes.
Profit margin as ‘buffer’ for wage
increases. Regulation of prod-
uct prices can change
earnings.
Power relations
Political impact
on the counterparta
Employer is also a legislator and
can always legislate the
desired result.
Trade unions can put political
pressure on politicians
through their members in
order to ensure their
objectives.
Management make their deci-
sions independently of the
trade union. Lower degree of
collective agreement coverage
and regulation.
Economic High degree of collective agree-
ment coverage, and the
employers save wages during
both strikes and lock-outs.
Only the trade unions are hit
economically – during both
strikes and lock-outs.
Both parties suffer financially
during both a strike and a
lock-out.
Instruments of conflict Right to strike and lock-out with
isolated exceptions for
particular groups
The right to strike and lock-out
Ibsen and Stamhus (2016).
aFor more detail, see Hebdon and Stern (2003).
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however, by the ability of citizens and companies to move to other locations with
lower taxes, which conversely undermines the negotiating position. Furthermore,
in recent years, outsourcing, free-choice options and private hospitals have wea-
kened the monopoly status of the municipalities and regions (for similar develop-
ment in the UK, see Bach, 2002).
The reasoning above (cf. also Freeman and Medoff, 1984: 51) indicates, in the
short term, that the elasticity of the demand for labour in the public sector can be
greater than in the private sector as the public employers have no ‘buffer’, for
example in the form of surplus profits or favourable positions in the product
market, which allows increasing wages to be passed by the product prices.
This undermines the negotiation position of the public organisations, ceteris pari-
bus, as well as their opportunity to achieve a better collective agreement result by
striking.
The trade union movement is further weakened in the public sector when it
comes to the utilisation of collective industrial conflict as a means to improve
their collective agreements because of the asymmetrical power relations – both
politically and economically – in the public sector (Traxler, 1999). As emphasised
earlier, there is a fundamental difference in the course of the dispute in terms of the
economic losses and, therefore, an incentive to make concessions to one’s counter-
part and ultimately reach an agreement. A strike in the public sector will affect the
ability of public employers to produce services for the citizen, leading to dissatis-
faction among their ‘customers’. Contrary to this, a strike will in most cases not
cost the public employers money. Public employers actually save wages while the
trade unions empty their war chests. While the trade union concession curve in a
Hicks model falls from left to right, the employer concession curve will not – as in
the Hicks model from the private labour market – increase from left to right, but
will actually fall and have a decreasing slope, as the dispute will produce economic
gains for the employers (cf. Figure 2).
Economically, the power relations between the parties in the two sectors are
therefore very different. While the economic power is fairly evenly distributed in the
private sector, there is a clear asymmetry in the public sector in favour of the
employers. When it comes to political power, the distribution of power is even
more in favour of the employers in the public sector, as the state can always
legislate its way to a result that is beneficial to the public employers.
The Kanslergade Agreement in 1933 was the first time that a Danish govern-
ment intervened and passed legislation in order to end a labour dispute. Since then,
government intervention has brought an end to major disputes in 1956, 1973, 1986
and 1998, and two disputes involving nurses were stopped by legislative interven-
tion in the 1990s (Ibsen in Jørgensen, 2014). The Danish government has typically
intervened in a labour dispute with reference to ‘third party’ losses and socio-
economic losses in the form of damage to Denmark’s competitiveness, a growing
balance of payment deficits and increasing unemployment. This requires special
timing in relation to the public sector, as open disputes are often heavily politicised
(Due and Madsen, 2003, 2006).
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When a government ends a conflict by resorting to regulatory intervention, it
has the character of binding arbitration. It is therefore up to the government to
draw a line that dictates wages, working hours and so forth that make up the law
that replaces the collective agreement until the next renewal of the agreement.
In other words, the government is responsible for assessing how the parties are
to be accommodated, as illustrated by the spread between W1 and W2 in Figure 3.
The political custom in Denmark is for the government to base its considerations
on a settlement proposal or outline from the Danish Conciliation Board and to
consult the social partners in the drafting of the legislation (Ibsen, 2014).
The economic asymmetry between the parties in the public sector means that
there are entirely different mechanisms at play in this context that determine in
whose favour the pendulum swings in a dispute. Here, it is largely the public
opinion that counts. Battles are won through strategic communication and spin
in a struggle for public sympathy. Communication and agenda-setting are import-
ant power resources for labour in the public sector (Gumbrell-McCormick and
Hyman, 2013). Disputes in the public sector are therefore always heavily politi-
cised, and the parties – or one of the parties – can therefore be affected by negative
public opinion.
The most significant difference between utilising the conflict weapon as a
solution in negotiating disputes is thus the asymmetrical power relations in the
economic and political spheres in the public sector, as the public employers have
their thumb on the power in both spheres (illustrated in Figures 1 and 2). This
would mean, ceteris paribus, that the traditional conflict weapons – strikes and
lock-outs as an institutionalised form of collective action – are unsuited for solving
conflicts in the public Danish collective bargaining model. In our opinion, the
teacher conflict in CBR13 is a good example of this.
UR Union Resistance Curve
EC Employers Concession 
Schedule  
W  
T  
Figure 2. Hicks model utilised in the public sector information retrieval (IR) system.
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Collective action in the public sector: The teacher lock-out
in 2013
In the following, we will demonstrate the problems involved in using collective
action in the public sector if the conflict weapon is used according to the rules in
the private sector. We use the teacher lock-out in CBR13 as an example.
The Danish Industrial Relations System in the public sector is highly centralised
on both sides of the table. At the state level, the Ministry of Finance (FM) nego-
tiates through the Agency for Modernisation (MS) with its counterpart, the
Confederation of State Central Unions (CFU), which negotiates on behalf of all
unions in the state sector. At the municipal level, the central organisation for the 98
municipalities in Denmark, the Local Government Denmark (KL), negotiates with
the ‘Negotiation Community’ (FF) (Forhandlingsfællesskabet), and at the regional
level, the Regional Employers (Regionerne) negotiates with FF as well.
The public employees had very low expectations for CBR13, as a ‘crisis aware-
ness’ from 2008 still prevailed in 2013. The public therefore expected a very peace-
ful collective agreement process. The fact that it did not unfold in this manner
throughout the public sector was primarily due to two factors: the employers’ new
and very aggressive negotiating proposal and negotiating strategy and the strong
coordination between the demands formulated by the Ministry of Finance, and the
employers’ interaction with the government’s political work with reform.
In the following, we will merely describe and analyse the negotiations at
the municipal level, being well aware that the public employers – the Ministry of
Finance/Agency for Modernization (Moderniseringsstyrelsen) and Local
Government Denmark (KL) – coordinated their objectives and negotiation
UR Union Resistance Curve
EC Employers Concession 
Schedule  
W  
T  
W1
T1
W2
Government 
intervenon
Figure 3. The Hicks model – strike ended by government intervention.
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strategies at the state and municipal levels and that the KL Strategy was in
many ways subordinate to the strategic objectives of the Ministry of Finance
(Mailand, 2014).
The KL demands on the municipality area were based on the economic crisis
and were in accordance with the KL long-term employer policy. KL was gambling
that the classic employer demands, such as more local wage formation and more
space for the local management, increased productivity and efficiency and an
increased labour supply. KL also wanted to reduce the number of protected
trade union representatives (shop stewards) and ensure that the cooperative
systems could be simplified and include fewer meeting days. But the hotbed for a
possible conflict was located somewhere else altogether. It was hidden in the sen-
tences: ‘the simplification of the arrangement of work is the key component to
increasing productivity in the municipalities. The rules for working hours must
therefore not hamper everyday practice or inhibit change and readjustments in
the local government services’ (KL, 2013, own translation). These two sentences
were generally directed at the municipal workplaces, but they were particularly
directed towards the everyday operations in the public elementary school system,
and the KL demands to the school teachers were clear: remove the special rules on
how working hours could be used and the rules allowing local agreements on
working hours. All of the agreements on preparation time were thus supposed to
lapse and be replaced by a general agreement on working hours: teachers have a 37-
hour work week. According to KL, in principle – like other public sector employees
– the teachers were to be present at the school 37 hours per week. The individual
teacher, in dialogue with the school management, should thereafter make agree-
ments on how work is to be organised, where the managers, due to their managerial
right, have the final word. Furthermore, KL demanded the liquidation of the spe-
cial seniority rules regarding working time. It later became apparent that the
Agency for Modernization had made the same rigid demands at the state level.
KL’s main demand in the elementary school area was therefore a strong
manager-controlled model, which in reality took power away from the school
teachers, their union representatives and organisations with respect to the organ-
isation of work and how work hours are used. The demands made by the Agency
for Modernization were entirely synchronised with those made by the teachers at
the state level where upper secondary schools dominated, which laid bare the
strong coordination of demands at an early stage in the negotiation process,
together with the strategic objectives shared by the Ministry of Finance/Agency
for Modernization and KL.
With respect to the interaction between the public sector employers and the
ongoing reform work taking place in the government, it quickly became apparent
to the public that the government’s high-profile elementary school reform was
politically and financially inextricably linked with the results of the negotiations,
particularly those between KL and the Danish Union of Teachers (Danmarks
Lærerforening – DLF). Just days before the parties exchanged demands, the gov-
ernment, via Minister of Education Christine Antorini, presented its proposal for
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elementary school reform. It quickly became clear that the reform was underfunded
and depended on the agreements regarding teacher working hours being changed in
the upcoming collective bargaining agreements. But the reform work had already
had consequences for collective bargaining well before the negotiations started.
Back in January 2012, the government had established a working group under
the Ministry of Finance that was entrusted with investigating the opportunities
for ‘getting their money’s worth’. The working group consisted of representatives
from the government presented by the Agency for Modernization and the muni-
cipal employers (KL). In this connection, the Danish Union of Teachers (DLF)
expressed its shock over not having been invited to participate in the negotiations
and pointed out that the working group could be seen as a two-part arrangement
(government–employers), but with a blind partner in the game (the teachers/wage
earners), as opposed to the three-part arrangement otherwise described in the
government platform. Access to government documents later revealed that the
reform group had discussed not only the content but also the financing of the
reform – and not least how possible courses of negotiations could come to look
in connection with the collective bargaining, including the coordination of a con-
flict and government intervention.
In that sense, CBR13 in the public sector was heavily politicised from the begin-
ning, which came to influence the course of the negotiations. The strategy of the
municipal and state employers appeared to isolate the teacher union (DLF) and
confront it head on over the existing working hour rules in elementary schools
(Mailand, 2014). At no point did the parties actually engage in negotiations, and
after a ‘paper-free tour’ through the conciliation institution that resulted in an exit
without any proposed mediation on the table, the lock-out that KL had threatened
in accordance with the rules of the main agreement came into effect. The lock-out
was extensive, involving almost 67,000 teachers at the municipal and state levels
who were covered by the collective agreement. It was precisely because the lock-out
was so extensive that the teachers were not able to counteract by striking, as all of
the teachers who were covered by the collective agreement had already been locked
out. What the teachers could do was to ask other trade unions and professional
associations to help by initiating sympathy disputes. This is an opportunity that
exists across the industrial sector and the main organisations. But DLF never
requested the announcement of sympathy disputes, apparently due to the fact
that the DLF leadership was worried that such a request would be turned down,
which would display DLF as being even more isolated and weakened (Mailand,
2014).
After 25 days, the dispute ended on 26 April by government intervention, which
met all of the significant KL demands regarding changes to working hour rules.
DLF was not included in the drafting of Act 409, as it came to be known.
This legislation abolished the rules for teachers’ working hours, and the teachers
received a modest salary increase in addition to the general settlement, protective
rules and DKK1bn (ca. E134 m) earmarked to boosting the teachers’ competence
levels.
12 Journal of Industrial Relations 0(0)
This paved the way for the financing of parts of the school reform and – in the
opinion of the government and KL – the introduction of a managerial right and
working hour rules that applied throughout the public sector and posed new power
relations and working conditions in Danish elementary schools.
The teaching lock-out: Casting light on the systemic error
in the conflict resolution model in the public sector
We can conclude that the dispute over the elementary school area as part of CBR13
made it likely that the copying of the conflict resolution model applied in the
private sector to the public sector was a problem on a number of levels and
could lead to solutions that did not harmonise with the thoughts and ideas
behind the construction of the Danish model of collective bargaining in the
public sector. As shown previously, this relates to how the material and structural
conditions that the rationale behind the private sector model for conflict resolution
depends upon are not present in the current conflict resolution system in the public
sector. As illustrated using Hick’s strike model, the public sector is struck by sys-
temic errors when it comes to the economic resources since the public employers
are also budgetary authority The purpose of the conflict is to inflict losses on
one another in order to achieve successive concessions from both sides, such that
the parties approach one another enough so that a settlement becomes possible.
There will typically be talk of economic losses for both parties regardless of whether
there is talk of a strike or lock-out if the conflict takes place in the private sector, but
in connection with the lock-out, it was only the one part – the teacher’s union – that
would suffer financial losses, whereas KL in particular would stand to gain from a
lock-out via saved wages. The total savings amounted to billions, while the locked-
out teaching organisations had to borrow money in order to cover the missing wages.
The employers in the public sector are also the budget authority, meaning that the
public coffers are in principle inexhaustible, whereas private companies can be threa-
tened by bankruptcy should disputes occur. The strike as a weapon of conflict thus
lacks its most important feature: the increasing financial losses on both sides of the
front line are in that sense unsuited to solving conflicts in the public sector.
Second, political power with the employers as legislators is also a problem.
As described earlier, the great lock-out was brought to an end by government
intervention and the passage of Act 409. There is really nothing new about
major disputes being ended by government intervention. As also described earlier,
this is actually part of the Danish agreement model. The problem with government
intervention in disputes in the public sector, however, is that the employers at the
state level enjoy the parliamentary power to take action. Whoever happens to be
presiding over the government must therefore be able to balance the two roles as
employer and legislator – the point being that there are no institutional rules or
conditions to ensure this. The system relies on soft regulation in the form of social
trust between the parties, which requires that the government refrain from spec-
ulating on the two roles and confusing its employer interests and political ambitions.
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Another relevant factor is the hierarchy among the public employers. From the end
of the 1990s and up to the 2000s, the state developed ever-increasing ‘micro-manage-
ment’ of the municipal finances through legislation in particular – including the 2012
Budget – via the coordinated regulation of the respective collective bargaining car-
ried out by the municipal and regional authorities. The Agency for Modernization,
and therefore the Ministry of Finance, has assumed a more pronounced ‘big brother’
role in collective bargaining in the public sector. The increasingly hierarchical con-
ditions between the public employers can be used strategically to implement national
political ambitions at the municipal level.
The intervention in the 2013 lock-out followed the pattern of the government
intervention in previous conflicts but was atypical on multiple parameters. Its con-
tent closely resembled the KL demands regarding the renewal of the collective
agreement (corresponding to wage level W2 in Figure 3), and neither party – as
is otherwise the custom – had any influence on the drafting of the legislation. This
was made possible due to the absence of a proposed settlement from the concili-
ator. It is otherwise a political custom in Denmark that if a government intervenes
in an industrial conflict, the most recent settlement proposal which is available
from the conciliator is the basis for a solution. The argument is that doing so respects
the parties’ self-regulation. Without a settlement proposal, however, the government
had a free pen, so to speak, and was thus able to write a new collective agreement via
the legislation without having to refer to existing agreements or drafts. DLF was not
consulted at all, which in turn provides support to the theory about how a master
plan had existed from the outset of CBR13 for the elementary schools, also including
how the dispute was supposed to end (Ibsen in Jørgensen, 2014; Mailand, 2014).
All told, we can conclude that the course of events surrounding CBR13 was a
veritable demonstration of power staged and carried out by the Ministry of
Finance/Agency of Modernization, with KL as a willing partner. This then invol-
untarily demonstrated how the use of collective industrial conflict as an institutio-
nalised collective action on the basis of the logic drawn from the private sector did
not fit with the regulatory logics, norms, rules and customs prevailing in the public
sector. In some ways, there is talk of a systemic error when actors in the public
sector unquestioningly copy the conflict resolution model used in the private sector.
The cause is the asymmetrical power relations at both the economic and political
levels. The analysis clearly shows that shifting ideas among governments, in terms
of austerity or modernisation efforts, can lead to public employers utilising the
existing institutions in new ways in order to maximise interests.
In the final section, we will briefly discuss other alternatives to the existing
conflict system.
Conflict resolution models in the public sector: Alternatives
to the current system
On the basis of the analysis presented here, we present a number of proposals in the
following for adjustments and changes to the current collective bargaining and
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conflict resolution system used in the public sector, which can contribute to
strengthening the model by ensuring free and depoliticised negotiations, thereby
limiting open labour disputes for the benefit of the parties and society in general.
It is important to emphasise that this list is by no means exhaustive, and that some
of the proposals are mutually exclusive while others supplement one another.
First, it seems reasonable to discuss whether the right of employers to collective
industrial conflict should/can be eliminated or moderated. Other countries have
placed far more severe restrictions on the role of the employer in the public sector
than is the case in Denmark. Some countries (e.g. Portugal, Italy) have completely
prohibited the use of lock-outs in the public sector, while others have highly
restrictive conditions for the use of collective weapons, and the rules of the game
are generally arranged in most places in order to counteract power asymmetries
(Elvander, 2002; Hebdon and Stern, 1998). One might imagine that the lock-out
might be reserved for use as a response to the right to strike. Another variation
could be that the wages saved by the employers should ‘remain in the system’ and
be earmarked for the continued education of the locked-out employees’ or that
there should be an expansion of the staff so that the economic consequences of the
conflict would be more evenly distributed.
Another way to go is via the greater involvement of a third party with, for
example, greater power in the Conciliation Board and/or the use of compulsory/
voluntary arbitration. For example, the Conciliation Board could be given more
power to make a settlement proposal or initiative compulsory. At the same time,
the mediation proposals can be made a binding starting point for any possible
government intervention (Stokke and Thornqvist, 2001).
A more radical change would be to eliminate the collective industrial conflict in
the public sector entirely, to be replaced by compulsory arbitration. Using a strike
as a weapon in a traditional wage struggle to increase the salary scale in the public
sector is already ineffective in the long term as long as trade unions and profes-
sional associations have taken the position that they will fight to maintain the
regulatory regime. If the trade unions strike their way to wage increases that
exceed the average wage increases in the private sector, the public wage increases
will automatically be reduced. Such events occurred after the strike in the public
sector in 2008, resulting in dramatic wage increases, while shortly thereafter, in
2009, the private sector was struck by the global financial crisis, which led to a
significant fall in private sector wage increases. If the unions in the public sector
secure wage increases via disputes and these increases outpace the increases in the
private sector, they will not be allowed to retain these gains, and a traditional wage
struggle in the public sector therefore makes little sense (Scheuer et al., 2016).
The power of being able to strike is therefore correspondingly limited, and the
same applies for the collective industrial conflict. Its elimination would therefore
be a limited loss for the union movement, and if the right to lock-out is abolished at
the same time, then the total gain for the trade union movement is positive.
Conversely, the power of the employers is more significantly restricted, and if the
alternative to eliminating the collective industrial conflict is the introduction of
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compulsory arbitration, then regulatory action with a one-sided bias in favour of
the employers is also reduced. All told, it would therefore appear as though the
trade union movement stands to gain the most from the elimination of the collect-
ive industrial conflict. It is also clear that the abolition of collective industrial
conflict will benefit the ordinary citizen as the third party, who often becomes a
hostage in an open labour dispute in the public sector.
As the analysis shows, one of the systemic errors is that the public employers are
also legislators and the Danish system has not granted particular consideration to
this dual role. In Sweden, for example, the Swedish Agency for Government
Employers (Arbetsgivarverket) was established in 1994, and is a public employer
authority under the Ministry of Social Affairs that is intended to ensure the ‘arm’s
length’ principle between politicians and public employers in order to ensure open,
free and depoliticised negotiations. An assessment made in connection with the
20th anniversary of the Swedish Agency for Government Employers shows that the
Swedish experiences are generally positive and regarded as an important stage of
development of the public Swedish agreement model (Arbetsgivarverket, 2014).
Finally, it is then obvious to point out that the public wage earner organisations
can get far with greater unity and by coordinating their negotiating strategy. While,
as mentioned earlier, there was a very close partnership between the Ministry of
Finance and KL before and during the collective bargaining, the corresponding
coordination on the side of the trade union movement was remarkably weak.
If the trade union movement is also willing to use the sympathy-dispute weapon,
the power of the trade union movement in the collective agreement game will grow
much stronger – yet with the caveat that as long as the regulation arrangement
exists, the power of the strike in labour disputes will be relatively limited.
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